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The question of whether reasoning can, or should, be described by a single normative
model is an important one. In the following, I combine epistemological considerations taken
from Piaget’s notion of genetic epistemology, a hypothesis about the role of reasoning in
communication and developmental data to argue that some basic logical principles are in
fact highly normative. I argue here that explicit, analytic human reasoning, in contrast to
intuitive reasoning, uniformly relies on a form of validity that allows distinguishing between
valid and invalid arguments based on the existence of counterexamples to conclusions.
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The question of the potential usefulness of normative models in
understanding human reasoning is a complex one, something that
underlies some of themore important debates in the psychology of
reasoning. Some of the earliest debates about the nature of human
reasoning were explicitly framed around the question of whether
human reasoning is essentially “logical” (e.g., Henle, 1962). In
these debates, the logical position essentially claimed that humans
possessed an inferential apparatus that would (mostly) invariably
lead to inferences that corresponded to those found in elemen-
tary logic textbooks, reprising Boole’s view that Boolean logic
simply described human reasoning. A more nuanced approach
to this question was given by Braine’s (1978) theory that claimed
that humans possessed certain limited syntactic reasoning pro-
cedures that invariable led to “logically correct” inferences (see
also Rips, 1983). These inference rules were the product of bio-
logical evolution. Finally, Piaget’s theory (Inhelder and Piaget,
1958) made a different claim, suggesting that while children went
through stages where their reasoning was constrained by physi-
cal and concrete parameters, their development led more or less
invariably to the stage of formal reasoning, where logical reason-
ing is the norm. In fact, Piaget explicitly proposed propositional
logic (albeit a modiﬁed version of this) as a competence model for
formal thought.
Unfortunately for these approaches, empirical research has
clearly shown that human inferential performance is highly vari-
able (Markovits, 1985; Overton et al., 1987; Cummins et al., 1991).
Many studies have shown that when even educated adults are given
what appear to be formally identical arguments, they give dif-
ference conclusions. Judgments of deductive validity differ as a
function of premise content (e.g., Markovits and Vachon, 1990;
Thompson, 1994; Cummins, 1995), and in response to factors
such as conclusion believability (Evans et al., 1983). There is little
surface evidence that the use of classical propositional logic as a
consistent basis for inferential reasoning is very wide-spread, even
among highly educated populations. One reaction to these studies
has been an attempt to reject the idea that human reasoning is
logical at all, by suggesting that much of the inferential apparatus
is dominated by biologically based forms of inference. For exam-
ple, the heuristics described by Tversky andKahneman (2004) and
Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), although differing in many respects
provide simple, context-speciﬁc forms of rapid inferential reason-
ing. These heuristics are context dependent, and their use can
account for at least some of the variability in human reasoning.
However, they do not correspond to a clear model of logic of
any kind, although one might suppose (as Gigerenzer explicitly
argues) that they are biologically efﬁcient. Similarly, the prob-
abilistic model proposed by Oaksford and Chater (2003, 2007)
and Evans et al. (2007) suggests that inferential procedures model
the (Bayesian) statistical properties of people’s knowledge of their
environment. Such models propose that people process relations
in a way that explicitly reﬂects their personal beliefs, which in turn
is at least partly determined by real-world knowledge stored in
long-term memory (Oaksford and Chater, 2012). Inferences are
thus basically probabilistic, and essentially variable, and translate
the real nature of people’s underlying knowledge. The question of
whether reasoning of this kind can be cast in terms of a normative
model is open, partly because there is not a strong consensus about
the way that probabilistic models function (Elqayam and Evans,
2013; Oaksford and Chater, 2013).
Nonetheless, it is worth making one speciﬁc point in this con-
text. Probabilistic models propose that people’s inferences are
determined by their individual estimations of conclusion likeli-
hood. Since there is no mechanism by which such estimations
can be judged as being more or less accurate, a normative model
that depends on some external criteria might seem to be impos-
sible to verify. It might, however, be possible to model standard
deductive inferences within a Bayesian framework. Deductive rea-
soning can be seen as an attempt to construct a representation of
premises for which there is a shared attempt to maintain some
consistent level of internal probability, e.g., a shared belief that the
probability of q|p for a given major premise is close to 1 (Oaks-
ford and Chater, 2012). In this case, it might be possible to use
a normative model in order to evaluate the way that people rea-
son in this constrained system. However, since such an exercise is
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clearly artiﬁcial, and does not generally reﬂect the nature of real
world information, norms of this kind will be correspondingly
artiﬁcial.
The key point is that probabilistic models of inference essen-
tially depend onwhatmust be idiosyncratic representations of real
world probabilities, since they depend on information stored in
long-term memory. This is quite critical, since it makes Bayesian
norms almost by deﬁnition undetectable. Bayesian models are
used to understand how people can detect environmental regular-
ities, something that is clearly biologically useful, since it allows
some level of anticipation of the speciﬁc properties of a person’s
immediate environment (Tenenbaum et al., 2006). However, envi-
ronments can be variable and individual experiencewill reﬂect this
variability. Thus, probabilisticmodels produce by their very nature
variable outputs that cannot be compared since this variability
reﬂects variability in inputs. Inferential reasoning can be applied
across the whole range of experience and probabilistic approaches
to inference must then reﬂect the wide variety of individual expe-
rience. Thus, it could be argued that these approaches suggest
that human reasoning cannot, even in principle, be described by a
normative model (Elqayam and Evans, 2011).
In the following, I will nonetheless attempt to argue that despite
variability and the undoubted inﬂuence of many forms of heuris-
tics, human reasoning in its conscious component does indeed
depend on a simple normative form of basic logic (which does
not necessarily correspond to a speciﬁc logical model), for both
epistemological and developmental reasons.
WHAT IS A NORMATIVE MODEL?
Before attempting a more speciﬁc analysis, it is important to
make some initial distinctions. Normative models can be consid-
ered in very different perspectives (Elqayam and Evans, 2011). In
the following, I will consider that a normative model is a pre-
scriptive description of the optimal way that a system should
function in order to accomplish its basic goals. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between such models and descriptive models,
which are attempts to describe the actual workings of a given
system in a real-life situation. Simple variability is not an indica-
tion that a normative model is inapplicable to a given system.
However, variability requires showing that the system’s func-
tioning tends towards a normative model when conditions are
optimized.
There is one further critical part of any analysis of normative
models. Normative models are mathematical or logical abstrac-
tions that aim to capture the essential functioning of what are
necessarily messy and complex systems. Such models are, by def-
inition, the product of human reasoning, since they are the result
of people trying to understand the basic parameters of a spe-
ciﬁc system. The role of normative models in the understanding
of human reasoning becomes double-edged, since such models
must not only describe the way that people can optimally rea-
son, but importantly these models must also be able to account
for the ability of people to construct these models in the ﬁrst
place.
With this in mind, it is useful to note that many normative
models have epistemological underpinnings that are essentially
based on standard bivalent deductive logic. Given the increasing
importance of Bayesian models, as discussed previously, it is par-
ticularly useful to note that Bayesian statistics are derived using
such logic. In fact, careful analysis of the arguments for proba-
bilistic models clearly shows that these are based not on Bayesian
inferences, but on classical logical arguments. If human inferences
were uniformly Bayesian, then one would expect arguments to be
phrased speciﬁcally in terms of degree of belief. However, con-
clusions that explicitly leave open the possibility that alternative
theories have a clear probability of being correct are rarely encoun-
tered. In other words, it is important to distinguish between the
characteristics of the output of a given model, and the epistemo-
logical underpinnings of these models. In most ﬁelds, the second
part of this equation is basically irrelevant. When discussing char-
acteristics of normative models of human reasoning, this becomes
fundamental. In fact, one key component of the argument that
will be presented is that a minimal normative model for human
reasoning is necessary in order to account for the ability to produce
normative models in the ﬁrst place.
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES
There is one ﬁnal distinction that is important in this context.
One response to the clear evidence that people’s reasoning does
not consistently conform to logical norms is the idea that there
exist two separable inferential systems. One of these is meant to be
a major source of variability in reasoning, while the other has at
least the potential to reason more logically. Dual process theories
(Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 1998; Evans, 2007) postulate
that people have two major inferential systems that interact with
each other. Such theories havemultiple forms anduse different cri-
teria to attempt to distinguish between these two systems. There
is, unfortunately, no real consensus as to the characteristics or the
deﬁnition of these two systems (see Evans and Stanovich, 2013, for
a recent discussion). However, roughly speaking, these postulate a
basically heuristic form of inference, which we is often referred to
as System 1, which is presumed to be an evolutionarily primitive
system that makes rapid inferences that are automated, contex-
tual, use surface properties of problems, and rely extensively on
stored knowledge. Such inferences are low-cost and do not involve
working memory capacity. The second system, which postulates a
more analytic form of inference, referred to as System 2, by con-
trast, is conscious, slow, and relatively costly in its use of working
memory.
Although there are variable descriptions of the dual process
framework, Evans and Stanovich (2013) suggest that one min-
imalist approach to this distinction is to suggest that heuristic
inferences correspond to rapid, autonomous inferential processes,
while analytic inferences are characterized by working memory-
based processes that support hypothetical thinking. The latter
are particularly characterized by cognitive decoupling, allowing
inferences that are not necessarily tied to existing knowledge
structures (Stanovich and Toplak, 2012). For our purposes, a
key characteristic of System 1 inferences is they are intrinsically
variable, since they necessarily reﬂect the idiosyncratic nature of
people’s internal representations. Given this intrinsic variability,
there is no reason to think that a single normative model would
ever be able to capture its properties, at least not within a rela-
tively straightforward model. However, System 2 allows at least
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the possibility of hypothetical thinking involving some degree of
conscious processing of information. If this basic distinction is
reasonably accurate, then the ability to even consider the possibil-
ity that normativemodels could existmust be the result of System2
processing.
DEVELOPMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY
With these distinctions in mind, there are two forms of argument
for a normative model for System 2 reasoning. The ﬁrst is an epis-
temological argument that partly owes its form to Piaget’s work
on cognitive development. Piaget in fact referred to his ﬁeld of
study as genetic epistemology. The basic argument, which was
derived from Kant (see Henle, 1962) can be stated as follows.
In order to adequately process the inﬁnite variety of informa-
tion that is potentially accessible, the human mind requires some
basic categories. Kant assumed that the basic categories were a
priori, that is, that they are a basic component of the human cog-
nitive system and are essentially biological. Such an essentialist
view of the basis of human cognition is actually quite common
in many developmental theories. For example, studies examin-
ing people’s understanding of categories and concepts (Gelman
and Markman, 1986), and object permanence (Baillargeon et al.,
1985) have indeed claimed that people have biological underpin-
nings that allow them to consistently extract speciﬁc categories
or object qualities from complex forms of information. These
are determined by the biological niche humans have constructed
over evolutionary time. For example, understanding that a phys-
ical object retains its basic identity even when it changes shape or
disappears would be a critical component of a cognitive system
evolved to survive in a world in which there is are constantly mov-
ing objects. Similarly, and more in line with our current problem,
understanding that objects thatmove by themselves can be consid-
ered to correspond to a category (which we refer to as implicitly
living). Objects in such living categories are considered to have
shared invisible attributes, which is a very useful way of con-
ceptually dealing with the world in which separating out living
from nonliving categories is a vital component, and understand-
ing the speciﬁc properties of the latter can be particularly useful.
Such a basically biologically based approach has in fact been pro-
posed for human reasoning. As stated previously, Braine’s natural
logic approach (Braine, 1978) takes just such a stance. There is
one problem with this, however. The distinction between living
and nonliving categories, and the ability to understand prim-
itive transformational consistencies, such as those required to
understand object permanence are found in very young children,
which at least suggests empirical support for a biological hypoth-
esis. This is simply not the case for inferential reasoning, and the
idea that there is an essential biological basis that corresponds to
some form of internal rules of inference appears to be empirically
untenable.
Piaget’s approach to this problem was both biological and
developmental (Piaget, 1971). In line with Kant, he assumed that
the human mind did indeed require basic categories in order to
adequately process information about an inordinately complex
world. However, he did not assume that these categories were bio-
logical in origin. Instead, he postulated that biology provided the
basic processes that allow systematic cognitive change. He also
postulated that such changes were essentially systemic. In other
words, he clearly made a distinction between the accumulation
of knowledge, which could lead to a piecemeal and unconnected
body of knowledge, and the development of the basic categories of
mind that allowed people to process such knowledge. This latter
can be considered the basis of the epistemology of the mind. In
this perspective, the idea of a normative model of the mind can be
seen as having the same basic function for cognition as the idea of
a universal grammar has for language. More speciﬁcally, if human
minds had essentially different epistemologies; that is, if they used
different basic forms of categorization and reasoning, then the
problem of just how people could communicate efﬁciently would
arise.
Piaget added one component to this analysis. He started from
empirical results that showed that children’s understanding of the
world appears to progress through different levels or stages. He
early on remarked that young children appear to have a more
primitive epistemology than adults that is the underlying basis of
their thinking relied on basic categories that were less consistent
than those that appear to underlie adult reasoning. For exam-
ple, young children have variable notions of the basic concept of
quantity, being unable to consider that quantity is an invariant
property of mass (Piaget et al., 1997). The lack of such invari-
ance makes their thinking inherently unstable. A parent who is
faced with a child who does not want to eat a meal because there
is too much food, and who mushes up the food into a smaller
area, is using this instability to successfully manipulate his or her
child. In contrast, adults have no problem understanding invari-
ance of quantity, in fact most consider the questions used to
examine this notion to be simply stupid, since the answers are
self-evident.
It is this form of basic difference in epistemology that Piaget
attempted to describe in his research program, something that
has often been lost in the debates over details about the age at
which speciﬁc abilities appear, etc. This approach thus assumed
that there was change and development in such a basic epistemol-
ogy. However, the course of this development is not really variable,
but was meant to mirror both the physical and biological prop-
erties that are critical components of the basic cognitive system.
Thus, Piaget postulated that there was an invariant developmental
sequence by which the very primitive cognitive categories present
at birth, combined with whatever innate tendencies might drive
early information processing, would gradually transform into the
adult version. Piaget also supposed that epistemological devel-
opment would tend towards the same basic normative model. A
critical point is understanding just why this would be true. One
reason,which underpins Piaget’s basic hypothesis is that epistemo-
logical structures are generated by interactions with the physical
world. These start by interactions based on action and perception.
Over time, and repeated interactions, children develop a logic of
actions, which follows a coherent and nearly universal sequence
(Piaget, 1965). In fact, this same sequence has beenobserved in pri-
mate species and somemammals (Scarr-Salapatek, 1976). Thus, it
could already be argued that the end-point of sensori-motor devel-
opment can be described by a normative model, one that reﬂects
the deep structure of theway that humans structure physical action
in the real world.
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To make this distinction more explicit, when it is claimed that
most 2 year-olds have the same basic epistemology, one that cor-
responds to a clear normative model, this does not mean that they
have learned the same things. Speciﬁc learning clearly depends
on the concrete environment in which children are raised. Thus a
child might learn that cookies are good to eat in one context, and
another might learn that candies are good to eat, depending on
what is available. However,when trying to get cookies or candies or
anything else that is desirable, that is hidden by an obstacle, all chil-
dren will use the same action logic. Once again, the actual actions
can vary (for example, one child might bat the obstacle away,
while another might reach for it to move it away), but the logic
of the action sequence is the same (action 1 is directed towards
the obstacle with the aim of displacing it, action 2 is directed
towards the goal). In fact, debates about sensori-motor cognition
are mostly about whether sensori-motor logic is developed faster
or slower, but there is little debate about the form of this logic.
There are thus quite solid grounds for suggesting that develop-
ment at this level can indeed be described by a normative model
(Dasen, 1972).
Piaget’s explanation of development considers that more
abstract forms of conceptually based cognition are derived by pro-
cesses of representation and symbolic manipulation of the logic of
actions. Thus, for example, basic categorization is derived from the
process of perceptually based similarity relations, causal categories
are derived from direct causality, etc. More speciﬁcally, reason-
ing reﬂects the basic structure of conditional action schemas. For
example, there are many ways to get a biscuit, thus understand-
ing the uncertainty of such actions directly reﬂects what children
have already learned about the physical world (Byrnes and Over-
ton, 1986). Increasingly abstract forms of reasoning require a long
and complex process of representation and restructuring of more
abstract concepts, but these still reﬂect the underlying structure
of the physical world. This point of view would thus suggest that
the end-point of epistemological development would be essen-
tially the same. Once again, if one examines studies looking at
the ability of pre-adolescents to make inferences about the con-
crete world, empirical results strongly suggest that the same level
is attained by most children, although there is a great variation in
age. Thus, most children can understand that liquid quantities
are conserved over transformations, allowing them to consis-
tently infer that a simple change in container will not alter the
quantity.
The same is found with transitive inferences, the logic of which
most children understand by adolescence when the content is con-
crete and clear (Markovits et al., 1995). Once again, similarly to
studies of sensori-motor development, debate about the form of
such concrete logic is not about the form of such logic, but about
whether the corresponding abilities are developed more or less
rapidly. Thus, there is also very clear evidence that the logic of
pre-adolescents, which allows understanding of many forms of
conservation, and basic forms of transitivity, causality, categoriza-
tion, etc. when these are applied to concrete, perceptible problems
consistently described the abilities (and performance) of most
pre-adolescents (although age of acquisition is highly variable).
In other words, a normative model can be claimed to exist to
describe the concrete reasoning of most children by adolescence.
Since development on the more abstract, formal level is derived
from reasoning structures developed previously, this suggests that
formal reasoning should indeed correspond to a single form of
normative model. This is indeed the underlying rationale for
Piaget’s claim that there is a single normative model for formal
thinking.
COMMUNICATION AND NORMATIVE REASONING
Having a shared epistemology is certainly useful in order to allow
different members of a species to process variable information
in ways that are internally consistent. There is one further argu-
ment for the existence of a single normative model of human
reasoning. If this normative model is a model of the underlying
epistemology of the conscious component of the cognitive system,
then the ability to communicate must require sharing the same
basic epistemology. In fact, it could be argued that normalization
of System 2 reasoning is particularly critical in this context. In
order to understand this point, it is useful to consider commu-
nication with System 1 (intuitive) reasoning. Although much of
just what is involved in such reasoning remains mysterious, we
can fruitfully speculate about some aspects of this. Intuitive infer-
ences can reﬂect (at least) two forms of information. The most
critical of these from our point of view is the internal structure
of experiences stored in memory. Theories such as probabilis-
tic models of inference (Oaksford and Chater, 2003) assume that
intuitive inferences reﬂect stored knowledge about the world. A
useful example is the belief-bias effect, which is the tendency
of people to accept conclusions that are judged as believable as
being logically valid (Evans et al., 1983). Although experiments
examining this effect use conclusions that are highly believable
for a large number of people, believability is clearly personal. In
addition, there is certainly an emotional component to the force
with which believability acts on System 2 processing. One excel-
lent example of this is given by a study by (Klaczynski, 2000).
He found that interference with System 2 processing was much
stronger when the beliefs that were being examined were related
to a domain with very high emotional valence (religion) than
when these were related to a domain with lower emotional valence
(class). There are increasing numbers of studies that link emo-
tional experiences to inference-making (Blanchette and Richards,
2010). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Intuitive processing
tends to be highly personal, in that it reﬂects idiosyncratic per-
sonal experience, which conditions not only understanding of the
underlying structure of experience and events, but is complicated
by emotional valences that clearly reﬂect individual experiences.
Intuitive processing is by deﬁnition unconscious, and certainly
experience shows us that idiosyncratic and emotionally driven
inferences do not generate much in the way of metacognitive
awareness.
In other words, intuitive processing can clearly serve individual
purposes by allowing people to make rapid, low-cost inferences
that reﬂect their past experience. Doing so increases the chances
that future behavior will mirror past circumstances, which allows
individuals to proﬁt from experience in a very immediate way. If
that were the end of the story, there would be no need for any
other inferential system. However, there is another component to
human behavior, and that is the fact that humans live in social
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groups. This makes intercommunicability a critical component
of any form of reasoning, since group behaviors require recon-
ciling many divergent individual agendas in a way that allows
group cohesion. Further complicating this dynamic is that fact
that group complexity increases exponentially with numbers of
group members. This explosion of social information has been
hypothesized to be a major evolutionary driver for human cog-
nition (Dunbar, 1993). Recently, Mercier (Mercier, 2011; Mercier
and Sperber, 2011) has proposed a general evolutionary theory for
the development of System 2 reasoning abilities that suggest that
these abilities have evolved in order to regulate communication in
complex social groups.
This perspective views reasoning as a form of argumentation
which allows people both to present overt reasons for actions in an
attempt to convince others and to allow others to evaluate argu-
ments. While reasoning might have other functions, it is a useful
hypothesis to see it as a means for exchanging explicit reasons
for action, since this would have the potential to allow groups to
make decisions thatweremore efﬁcient than a simplemajority rule
would provide. Seeing reasoning as a form of communication, or
even as a useful underpinning for communication, makes an even
stronger case for the existence of a common epistemological core,
since the essence of argumentation requires a sufﬁciently strong
common basis.
Now, there are (at least) two ways that effective communication
can be insured. The ﬁrst involves the use of common biologically
based intuitive schemas. In the absence of explicit language or
symbolic thought, such schemas characterize the social cohesion
of many social animals. There is reasonable evidence that humans
also have such implicit social schemas. For example, we have
recently shown that humans share an intuition about coalition for-
mation as a function of individual power that is similar to what has
been found behaviorally in chimpanzees (Benenson et al., 2009).
Another form of implicit inference is that underlying the Gricean
view of linguistic communication, in which pragmatic interpreta-
tions of language acts are underpinned by common assumptions
that are derived from shared experience (Grice, 1981). However,
such intuitive schemas can only work well when social behavior
is relatively constrained. Human social behavior, while certainly
sharing many aspects with more biologically constrained social
species, is, however, very ﬂexible. Flexibility, while allowing greater
ability to adapt to changing circumstances, has a clear effect on
the possibility of ensuring effective communication solely on the
basis of shared intuitive schemas. This puts a greater functional
burden on overt, language based communication to ensure that
social interactions do not degenerate into conﬂicts based on dif-
fering individual intuitions and perceptions. But, in order for such
communication to serve this function, it is imperative that there
exist a shared epistemology, i.e., that the ideas shared overtly are
underpinned by some common basic principles of reasoning. This
again provides theoretical weight for the idea that explicit human
reasoning should have a normative core.
WHAT WOULD A NORMATIVE MODEL OF REASONING LOOK
LIKE?
There are thus reasons related to the basic epistemology of human
cognition and to the importance of reasoning to communication
that suggest the necessity of a single normative model for explicit
human reasoning. There are some basic considerations that can
give clues to just what this model entails. The ﬁrst is an argu-
ment from conceptual power. The last couple of hundred years
have led to a proliferation of models of logic that have radically
different underpinnings. Each of these models is a product of the
human mind, individually or in concert with others. One impor-
tant constraint for a normativemodel that does indeed correspond
to the workings of the explicit, analytic mind is that it should
allow the construction of multiple forms of models of logic. In
addition, such a model should be readily understandable by most
people, exactly because of the premise of communicability that
we have claimed previously. Both of these constraints, along with
historical and developmental considerations suggest that the nor-
mative model of the mind should involve some basic principles
that underpin the notion of validity.
Secondly, one of the key components of cognitive develop-
ment is that change goes towards increased complexity. A good
example of this is well-documented in language learning, the phe-
nomenon of over-generalization. Young children are faced with a
complex variety of linguistic forms, with many idiosyncratic for-
mulations which have historical roots, but often violate what are
more frequent forms. Children’s strategies for learning language
is to identify (by whatever process this is done) the most frequent
pattern, and generalize this as a rule that is used in all occurrences
of a given class, even when this involves generating words that
have never actually been encountered (Onnis et al., 2002). Young
children do the same with cognitive categories, picking out simple
rules and extending these to concepts that arenot actually instances
of these categories. In other words, the developing human mind
has a clear strategy, which requires generating simple rules and
extending these to a wide variety of instances. It is only through
continued interactions and reﬂection that these initial simple rules
are extended tomore complex concepts.What this in turn suggests
is that if basic analytic reasoning relies on core normative princi-
ples, it will take a form that reduces the cognitive load required to
reason. Thus, while there are a multitude of logical systems that
take into account the true complexity of human experience, this
argument suggests that normative principles will be less complex
than any of these logics.
In this perspective, developmental studies can provide some
very useful information. As we have seen, variability is a key
characteristic of the reasoning of adults. However, while such
variability is suggestive of a system of thought that has no com-
mon epistemology, the addition of an intuitive component of the
functioning of the human mind makes variability more readily
explicable in terms of the combination of a personal form of intu-
ition which reﬂects individual experience and explicit, analytic
thought that despite some variability has similar underpinnings.
The problem here is to determine exactly what are the crit-
ical components of normative thinking. The key to this is to
distinguish between a normative model that is determined by
its outcome, and one that is described by the nature of the
underlying processes. Most studies that have looked at whether
people reason normatively have examined outcomes, speciﬁcally
whether the responses given to inferential problems are the same
as whatever norm is being compared to. However, unless it is
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believed that inferential rules are constructed directly in the mind
(as some theories do indeed suggest, e.g., Braine, 1978; Rips,
1983), we can rephrase the question of normality by trying to
specify what kinds of underlying analyses must be implied by
any system of thought that can in principle produce “correct”
answers.
CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF VALIDITY
In this perspective, we can distinguish at least two major com-
ponents of basic logic that are necessary to produce a form of
reasoning that can in principle become powerful enough to gen-
erate complex normative models. One important use of such a
logic is the ability to explicitly examine the consequences of intu-
itive forms of reasoning in a way that allows people who do not
share the same intuition to communicate. One key component
of this ability is understanding the distinction between belief and
some form of validity. In other words, before people can explic-
itly examine and compare the consequences of divergent personal
experience, they must be able to distinguish, at least in princi-
ple, inferences that are derived directly from experience and those
derived by some process of “logical reasoning”.
If this corresponds to a basic component of human reasoning,
then it should be evident, in some form, in children. In fact, there is
clear evidence that this distinction is fairly primitive. For example,
Moshman and Franks (1986) found a clear developmental trend so
that by early adolescence,most children can spontaneously under-
stand the distinction between belief and validity, well before the
level of schooling in which this distinction is taught. More strik-
ingly, Morris (2000) found that children as young as 5-years of
age, when given an appropriate content can generate this distinc-
tion. In other words, understanding the distinction between belief
and validity is an early developmental acquisition, a critical one if
explicit reasoning is indeed a counterpoint to intuitive reasoning.
Of course, this is not really news to parents of young children,
who despite the real difﬁculties of doing so, are nonetheless able to
“reason”with children in a way that confronts the child’s intuitions
with some form of logic.
POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY: COUNTEREXAMPLES IN
REASONING
If children can understand the distinction between validity and
belief, the next question is just how validity is determined. This of
course goes to the question of just what kind of “logic” is available
to children, and how this is related to the logic of adults. I have
claimed (Markovits, 1993) that the key component of understand-
ing this question derives from one of Piaget’s later works, on the
relation between possibility and necessity (Piaget, 1987).
Before examining this, it is useful to make an important dis-
tinction underlying Piaget’s approach. Piaget proposed standard
propositional logic as a competencemodel for advanced adult rea-
soning. This has often been interpreted as implying a rule-based
form of reasoning, which would invariably lead to standard log-
ical responses. However, this is a mischaracterization. What was
speciﬁcally proposed was that the underlying epistemology that
characterized advanced adult reasoning would allow the ability to
generate such responses. The work on possibility and necessity
was an attempt to specify the nature of this epistemology. The
basic question that was raised concerns the kinds of factors that
can explain how children and adults can conclude that a potential
conclusion is necessary. The analysis makes no mention of rules,
instead it places such logical conclusions within the more gen-
eral context of the range of information that can be generated by
the reasoner. In this, one critical component of reasoning is the
range of possibilities that are processed by children in the context
of a given problem. A given inference is necessary if it excludes
whatever possibilities are generated by the child at the moment of
reasoning. This corresponds to what one could refer to as local
necessity, since the actual generality of a conclusion depends crit-
ically on the range of possibilities that are generated. Critically, if
a child or adult is aware of a possibility that is not excluded, they
will reject a given conclusion. This interaction between possibili-
ties and necessity is modulated by the degree of abstraction of the
processes used to analyze a given problem.
A similar idea underlies the mental model analysis of reasoning
(Johnson-Laird, 2001; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). Mental
model theory considers that people construct internal represen-
tations of possible states of the world (models) that characterize
the major premise of a given inference. Possible states must be
generated by a reasoner, based on combinations of semantic and
pragmatic factors (Byrne, 2005). Critically, an inference is con-
sidered to be valid if there are no explicit counterexamples in the
reasoner’s representation. The presence of a counterexample is
sufﬁcient to render a putative conclusion invalid. An inferential
judgment is thus an on-line consequence of a reasoner’s ability to
(1) generate amore or less full range of possibilities consistent with
premises and (2) determine whether these possibilities contain a
counterexample.
One important distinction between the Piagetian analysis and
mental model theory is that the latter postulates that internal
representations are derived from a semantic analysis of logical
connectors, albeit one that is modulated by pragmatics. Since
the semantics of logical connectors are assumed to be generally
invariant, variation in reasoning performance is accounted for
by such individual difference factors as memory capacity. Mental
model theory does not have a very clear developmental compo-
nent, although Barrouillet and colleagues (Barrouillet and Lecas,
1999; Barrouillet et al., 2008) have suggested that workingmemory
limitations can affect children’s ability to actually represent the full
semantics of logical connectors. Developmentwill necessarily tend
towards the same forms of logical reasoning that are determined by
the shared semantics of logical connectors. Thus, althoughmental
model theory presents an analysis of reasoning that is consistent
with the interaction between possibility and necessity, the devel-
opmental component has a very different focus (seeMarkovits and
Barrouillet, 2002 for a version of mental model theory that has a
developmental focus that is more consistent with the Piagetian
model).
Piaget’s work indicated that one of the key factors in devel-
opment is the ability to generate increasingly abstract forms of
possibilities (Gauffroy and Barrouillet, 2011). Young children start
by considering possibilities that are more concrete and related to
the situational factors for a given problem context. With devel-
opment, these possibilities become more extended and abstract,
and less tied to situational constraints. However, by 6- or 7-years
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of age (Markovits, 2000), children can understand that a conclu-
sion that eliminates all other possibilities is necessary. Of course,
since this judgment of necessity depends on the range of pos-
sibilities that are eliminated when this conclusion is made, it is
subject to revision even if exactly the same form of reasoning is
applied, since the generation of possibilities can vary from one
moment to the next. In other words, reasoning at this level is
sequentially defeasible (Pollock, 1987), that is the same person
can arrive at a different conclusion for the same inference, sim-
ply because the domain of possibilities accessed during reasoning
might change, seeMarkovits (1985) andByrne (1989) for examples
of defeasible reasoning in adults. However, the processes by which
judgments of validity are made are in principle general. More
importantly, it is possible to overtly challenge any such inference
by comparing possibilities. This in turn is realistic only because
judgments of validity depend, not on an accumulation of data,
but on the presence or absence of a counter-example to a given
conclusion.
There is one further point that can be made in this context.
As noted previously, it has been argued that most relations are, in
real life probabilistic (Oaksford and Chater, 2007). If the point of
reasoning was to faithfully reﬂect the real characteristics of the real
world, then one would expect reasoning to be essentially proba-
bilistic. However, the analysis of “logical” reasoning that I use here
does not generate conclusions such as “it is probably true that. . ..”
It simply allows judgments of validity or not, in other words, it
allows concluding that something is certain or that it is not. Why
should this form of judgment be useful when trying to reason-
ing about phenomena that are inherently probabilistic? There are
some good reasons for this, but the chief one is that it is cogni-
tively much simpler. While a probabilistic judgment or any other
kind of intuitive judgment that relies on stored knowledge about
the world can conceivably be made very rapidly by associative
processes, explicitly communicating the basis for such judgments
would in theory require explicitly processing a large quantity of
information. In fact, in many cases most people are unable to
do such explicit processing. In this, case comparing conclusions
would simply result in people ﬁghting over personal beliefs. Even
if we assume that a reasoner does (remarkably) have conscious
access to the relevant information, and is consciously aware that
conclusion X is probable because of data set Y, the problem of how
someone else, whose personal data base does not contain the same
information, can process this conclusion.
A useful, because somewhat more real example, can be taken
fromresearchon aggressive behavior. Oneof theunderlyingmech-
anisms of such behavior concerns the expectation (mental model)
that a given social interaction will have an aggressive outcome
(Dodge et al., 1990). Children who develop a strong expectation
that interactions will be aggressive, tend to infer that most actions
will have an aggressive outcome. Now, imagine that two chil-
dren with differing expectations are interacting, and attempting
to determine the outcome of a given course of action. In order
to make a reasonable comparison, both children would have to
recount the many kinds of interactions that form the basis of their
expectations. Then each would have to attempt to integrate the
other’s information into their own internal data base, a daunt-
ing task at best, and one that would require not only a great deal
more cognitive resources that most children possess, but a great
deal of time. The fact that such discussions do not really take
place might well account for the difﬁculty in lowering aggressive
behavior (Dishion et al., 1999). In contrast, since many arguments
consist in deciding on taking a given course of action or not, a sim-
ple counterexample strategy would be quick and useful, precisely
because of its inherent limitations. If this is indeed characteristic
of basic reasoning, then once again, developmental studies should
provide evidence.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELEMENTARY CONDITIONAL
REASONING
We can illustrate this evidence by examining simple conditional
(if–then) reasoning. Conditional reasoning is one of the key com-
ponents of propositional logic, and is certainly one, if not the
most, frequently studies forms of reasoning. Piaget considered
that conditional reasoning was one of the key competencies of for-
mal operational thinking. The basic approach that we are taking
here suggests that understanding the development of conditional
reasoning will rest upon the basic understanding of the interplay
between possibility and necessity and the way that this can be used
increasingly abstract context. The key component of this sugges-
tion is identiﬁcation of just what the range of possibilities are
required in order to make “logical” conditional inferences, and
whether children are able to process these in a way that allows
them to make simple judgments of validity.
To simplify this discussion, we focus on two conditional infer-
ences. The Modus ponens (MP) inference involves reasoning that
“If P then Q, P is true.” The afﬁrmation of the consequent (AC)
inference is “If P then Q. Q is true.” The logical conclusion to
a MP inference is that “Q is true”. Now studies with adults have
shown that the ability to conclude that the MP inference is valid
depends on the extent to which disabling conditions (Cummins
et al., 1991; Cummins, 1995) are incorporated into people’s rep-
resentations of premises. A disabling condition (disabler) is a
condition that is associated with a given P then Q premise, one
that could invalid the link between antecedent and consequent
terms. The strongest form of disabler is given when reasoning
with empirically false premises, for which the true relation is a
disabler. Very young children have little problem in considering
MP inferences to be valid for a variety of contents. The one major
exception is reasoning with empirically false premises, for which
young children have great difﬁculties in accepting the MP infer-
ence. However, interventions that allow them to inhibit retrieval
of the true disabler, such as embedding premises into a fantasy
context (Dias and Harris, 1988, 1990) dramatically improve their
ability to accept this inference. With increasing age, children are
more able to spontaneously inhibit potential disablers when given
standard logical instructions (Markovits and Vachon, 1989).
In contrast, there is no logical conclusion to an AC inference,
although typically, many people respond to AC inferences by con-
cluding that “P is true” (Cummins et al., 1991; Thompson, 1994).
The reason for the theoretical lack of any logical conclusion is
that a true conditional allows for the possibility of what have been
referred to as alternative antecedents, that is cases where alter-
nate conditionals “If A then Q” are, or might be true. Considering
such alternatives (which comprise the domain of possibilities in
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this case), allows producing a counterexample to what is the usual
AC conclusion. In fact, there is strong empirical evidence that the
availability of such alternative antecedents in memory is a strong
determinant of the conclusions given to AC inferences (Markovits
andVachon, 1990; Cummins et al., 1991; Thompson, 1994; Quinn
and Markovits, 1998). In other words, when people can access
such alternatives when reasoning, they tend to reject the certain
conclusion for AC inferences.
Analysis of both the MP and the AC inference shows that,
in both cases, children’s judgments of validity are determined
by the kind of information that is incorporated into the repre-
sentation of premises, during the online process of reasoning.
Although the speciﬁc information varies (disablers and/or alter-
native antecedents), the basic dynamic is the same. Even young
children will accept a conclusion as valid if their representation
of the premises does not include a potential counterexample, oth-
erwise the conclusion will be considered to be invalid. Finally,
although considering these two inferences is particularly useful,
it is worth brieﬂy examining the two other inferences that deﬁne
conditional logic. Studies have generally shown that responses to
the denial of the antecedent (DA) inference responds to the pres-
ence or the absence of alternative antecedents in the same way
as AC inferences. The developmental pattern is also very similar.
Similarly, the modus tollens (MT) inference corresponds some-
what similarly to the MP inference to the presence of disablers.
However, the use of negation in both these inferences somewhat
complicates analysis. Understanding the basic notions underlying
the understanding of logical validity is more easily presented by
concentrating on the MP and the AC inferences.
I have in fact argued that the best elementary deﬁnition of
“logical” reasoning is the ability to understand the certainty of the
MP inference and to simultaneously understand the uncertainty
of the AC inference (Markovits and Lortie Forgues, 2011). As I
have stated, the key factor in this form of reasoning is the kind of
information that is incorporated into children’s representations of
premises. Constructing a representation of premises that does not
include potential disablers, but that does include potential alter-
native antecedents requires inhibiting the former while retrieving
the latter. The tension between these two contradictory cognitive
processes can explain why even educated adults ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
reason logically in the limited sense that we use (see Markovits,
2014). However, there is strong empirical evidence that children
as young as 6–7-years of age are indeed able to understand both
the certainty of the MP inference and the uncertainty of the AC
inference, when the content of conditional premises allow for very
ready access to alternatives. For example, when reasoning with
propositions such as “If an animal is a dog, then it has four legs.
An animal has four legs. Is it a dog?,” young children will readily
reject this inference (Markovits, 2000). More tellingly, they will
do so by explicitly citing the existence of a counterexample to the
implied conclusion (“cats have four legs”). When given problems
where the alternatives are explicitly presented, even younger chil-
dren will reject the AC inference while accepting the MP inference
(Markovits and Thompson, 2008).
In other words, very young children are able to reason “logi-
cally” with simple, direct forms of propositional logic when the
content allows appropriate inhibition and retrieval of relevant
information. Given the strong tendency of children to accept infer-
ences, themost striking part of these results is that they are capable
of processing the fact that there are alternatives to a putative con-
clusion, and using this as a basis for rejecting a putative conclusion.
I would then argue that this is exactly the nature of the kind of log-
ical reasoning that is the “norm” for most people, which involves
constructing a simple representation of an inference and deciding
on the validity of a potential conclusion based on the existence of
a possible counterexample.
Does thismodel imply that childrenor even educated adultswill
consistently give the standard propositional logic answer to (for
example) all AC inferences. Not at all. Since the exact response to
any inference depends on the range of counterexamples that are
generated while reasoning, which is in turn related to retrieval and
inhibitory processes, variability is expected. This is an important
point to make. The increasing ability to generate potential coun-
terexamples can in fact produce variable responses. For example,
children who are more efﬁcient in simply producing potential
causal alternatives tend to reject theMP inferencemore frequently
(Janveau-Brennan and Markovits, 1999). This corresponds to the
notion of local necessity, in which validity is the result of applica-
tion of the basic principle related to counterexample detection to
anonline process of possibility generation. Thus, thismodelmakes
no presuppositions about the nature of the underlying rules or
algorithms. Such abasic epistemology is thuspotentially consistent
with a wide variety of reasoning systems, including for example
the incomplete logic proposed by Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009).
The important part of this conception of reasoning is the idea
that people can recognize the presence or the absence of a coun-
terexample and use this to make a judgment of validity that is
internally consistent. Critically, especially for its usefulness in
communication, people can adjust their inferences based on exter-
nally communicated counterexamples. Evidence shows that both
children (Rumain et al., 1983) and adults (Markovits, 1985) will
revise conclusions to AC inferences when given additional infor-
mation about potential alternative antecedents. Similarly, explicit
information suggesting disablers results in adults rejecting theMP
inference (Byrne, 1989). The effect of providing explicit infor-
mation about the existence of potential counterexamples is to
reliably increase rates of rejection of conclusions that were pre-
viously accepted. In other words, both children and adults are able
to revise conclusions that are generated by their internal infer-
ential processes simply by considering alternatives furnished by
other people. In a similar vein, Klaczynski (2001) has shown that
children are able to recognize logical arguments that rely on the
presence of counterexamples as being superior to arguments that
rely on other kinds of processes.
In this context, basic logical reasoning can be seen as the abil-
ity to use a counterexample to invalidate an otherwise acceptable
conclusion. Empirical results show that this ability is present
at a very early age. Critically, there is also evidence that both
children and adults can use externally presented counterexam-
ples to modify their own inferences. Thus logical reasoning has
both an internal function that allows for judgments of validity
and an external function that provides a basis for modifying per-
sonal judgments by considering speciﬁc arguments that present
potential counterexamples.
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If such an ability does indeed represent the kernel of logical
reasoning, then development should reﬂect not any change in this
basic form of logic, but should be tied to the increasing ability to
generate and inhibit potential counterexamples in an increasingly
abstract way. I have indeed argued that this is a good description
of the development of simple conditional reasoning between early
childhood and later adolescence (Markovits, 2013). To summarize
this pattern, young children can consistently reject the AC premise
and accept the MP premise for premises that use if–then relations
that link classes and properties (Markovits, 2000). The ability to
do the same with causal conditionals (“If cause P then effect Q”) is
found only in pre-adolescents (Janveau-Brennan and Markovits,
1999). Reasoning this way with contrary-to-fact premises is a later
development (Markovits and Vachon, 1989). Finally, understand-
ing the certainty of the MP inference and the uncertainty of the
AC inference with completely abstract premises is a much later
development, and is only found with educated adults (Venet and
Markovits, 2001; Markovits and Lortie Forgues, 2011). In other
words, the developmental pattern is completely consistent with
the idea that the basic mechanism underlying simple logical rea-
soning is available to quite young children, and that subsequent
development extends this same process to increasingly complex
and abstract forms of content.
Importantly, extending basic reasoning to abstract content
(Markovits and Lortie Forgues, 2011) gives the ability to reason
logically even with content that has no concrete referents or for
which the referents are unintuitive. Such a form of reasoning is
the historical basis for the various models of logic that have been
constructed, and which correspond to a wide variety of different
forms of reasoning. In other words, the kind of abstract reasoning
that develops from the primitive base found in young children can
become powerful enough to allow people to construct normative
models of many types.
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